“Truth be Told”: Is That even Possible?

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Ever since the release of the original Matrix in 1999, who knows how many people have used the term “red pill vs blue pill.” Many claim to have such pills and offer them. Just on top of mind, instantly I have three examples: a blogger, a pastor, and a scientist. These are specific people I have in mind, but I’m not naming any, because this essay is not about debating anyone. I’m neither promoting nor refuting anyone’s claim. Instead, the question that I’m investigating in this exercise is, assuming one has the truth, is it possible to tell it to people? In other words, is truth a thing or noun that lives in one’s mind, and is it possible to transmit this thing into another’s mind simply by telling?

Many people believe they can. For a concrete example, please allow me to use the images that appeared on top of my mind: the blogger (who happens to be a political blogger). Again, I want to emphasize I’m not debating anyone. In fact, right now, for a moment I will suppose that his view is right. I’m now supposing this blogger has the truth, that he is right on everything: society, governance, and all other things his claims touch. Is it possible to transmit that truth to another? Can he — or I, supposing I’m a disciple of his — get another to see, experience, or understand the truth simply by my telling?

Consider what happens when I try to transmit some truth by telling. For simplicity’s sake, let’s take the spoken words medium. I have a set of words, that I then speak. The sounds I produce are then heard by the hearer. Of course, the hearer may ignore the words. But assuming a best-case scenario, the hearer then processes my words, producing thoughts according to their conditioning. In other words, at best, if the hearer has been conditioned with the same language and structures (e.g. on English, or on Euclidian geometry, and so on.) the hearer may be able to produce the same thoughts that I have. But is that all truth is, thoughts? If two people have the same thought — and they assume the thought is true — can we say now that we both have the truth?

I suppose now I can proceed to the pastor’s example. Surely the pastor will not accept the claim that Jesus is merely a thought. The Great I Am — the one that says “I am the Way the Truth and the Life” — surely cannot be limited by the bounds of any one’s thoughts. In fact, if I had been churched correctly, the Christians would say that even if there were no human that thinks, Jesus would still be. So if the “Great I Am” cannot be limited by anyone’s thoughts, what are we doing when we say we are transmitting truths by telling? Are we just transmitting a thought? Are we trying to produce a thought in another’s mind? Is that what we are doing? When we say “Oh, we are trying to make people understand”, how exactly? With a thought? (In Christian terminology, the church would say “we are shepherding so the flock can have a direct relationship with Christ”, but this is going into theology, which I think is outside this essay’s scope of coherence. So I’m not going there, but I want to discuss that “direct relationship” later.)

Perhaps now we can take a look at the scientist. (Again, as in the other two examples, these are not archetypal examples, but actual examples. I’m just not naming them.) In all that he can possibly tell anyone, what is he doing? Yes, we use words to develop relationships and entertain ideas. But regarding truth, isn’t what matters what those words or thoughts point to? Isn’t our goal for the hearer to directly perceive — i.e. understand directly and as profoundly as possible — reality as it is? (I would say that the term “goal” is irrelevant, especially when instead of trying to convince people, we are inviting people to examine.) I hope the scientist isn’t trying to convince the world that only his views or his school’s are true. I hope he and all scientists are concerned with reality as it is, not as our limited frameworks demand it to be. 

So going back to the question of “truth be told”, is it possible for truth to be told? When we declare a certain set of words that we believe to be true, are we so certain that the hearer will hear exactly the truth we want them to hear? Will they not have different ways of looking at things, different background knowledge and different ways of experiencing that personal knowledge? So what are we doing when we are telling people something we want them to accept as truth? In other words, to go back to the point of the essay, is truth a thing that lives inside someone’s mind? Is truth a type of thought? And can truth be transmitted? In other words, when the one that claims to have the truth asserts he is giving a red pill, what is he giving? If he is giving the blue pill, what exactly is he giving? Can truth be told? Or must truth or reality be directly perceived?

In the stead of convincing or persuading people of some truth, would it not be more accurate to say that we are inviting people to examine for themselves? Or, to use the words of the Buddha found in the Pali language Kalama Sutta, “Come, see for yourself!” For this very reason, I no longer ask that people accept anything I say. In its stead, I only ever invite people to inquire together, in the hope that they will see for themselves.

New York, New York

July 14, 2025

(In the next essay, I have a great, concrete example of how to approach truth from a 1968 dialogue at the Claremont Institute former Blaisdell Institute in Claremont, California . Actually, I need this “Truth be Told” essay to produce the necessary foundation for what I will be talking about in the next essay.)

Story Effects on Self-Concept in Memory and Imagination

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Abstract
Some research literature have suggested that stories can influence the self-concept. We want to test whether a narrative does influence people’s notions of self in their memory or imagination. Our hypothesis is that being exposed to a story makes one reconstructs one’s self in one’s memory or imagination to be more aligned with the story’s main character. With an experiment, we exposed participants (n=129) to two conditions (control: report of facts; treatment: the facts in a story form), and then asked the Likert-scale questions to see whether they report selves in their memory or imagination that resemble the story’s main character. Using independent sample t-tests, we found no statistically significant results. Therefore, we failed to reject our Null hypothesis — there was not enough evidence to reject it.
Keywords: story, narrative, self-concept, mental time travel, memory reconstruction

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Vivid Visual Imagery Supports Autobiographical Recollection

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Abstract
This is a planned study, despite its language. It was part of a class. In this proposed study, we examine the relation between vividness of one’s visual imagery and one’s recollection of autobiographical memories. Despite the thousands of citations of David Marks’ 1973 foundational paper of assessing one’s visual imagery vividness, only a few had looked directly at visual imagery in connection with autobiographical memories. This study seeks to fill that gap. We are the first to utilize both the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire and the Autobiographical Recollection Test in a correlational study. We studied 100 college students (49 male, 48 female, 3 non-binary or prefer-not-to-say). We found that scores of VVIQ of Marks correlates to high scores of ART. Moreover, the correlation extends to all aspects of Autobiographical Recollection as modeled by Berntsen et al. T-tests confirm the findings by showing that the effect size is noteworthy: high scorers in VVIQ have higher means of ART scores — and all 7 of ART subscales — than low scorers of VVIQ. These findings suggest, inter alia, further possible explorations into the directionality of the relation of the two constructs, into  connection between the processes underlying the generation of vivid imageries and the recollection of autobiographical memories, and into the development of clinical treatments to improve wellbeing.
Keywords: visual imagery, autobiographical memory, vividness, memory recollection, narrative coherence, narrative relevance

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Maximizer Students Exert More Effort but are Less Satisfied

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Abstract
Inspired by prior groundbreaking studies on maximizing by Simon and other researchers, we sought to see whether the findings extend to lower-stakes decision-making. The particular lower-stakes context we chose to study is class selection by college students. We examined the relationships between maximizing tendency and four variables: information-seeking behavior, efforting behavior, regret affect, satisfaction affect. We had 130 different participants (64% female, 32% male, 4% other) from three semesters of a particular Pscyhology class at a university. The participants took an online questionnaire, which measured their maximizing tendency, behaviors, and affects related directly to our investigation. Through correlation tests, we found that maximizing was positively correlated with information-seeking (r = .34, p < .001), with efforting (r = .37, p < .001), and with regret (r = .23, p = .01); maximizing was negatively correlated on the outcome satisfaction variable (r = -.19, p = .03). With a Median Split and independent samples t-tests, we found that maximizers score higher in every area except on outcome satisfaction, where we did not find any result statistically significant. Our findings suggest there is a relationship between maximizing and the aforesaid behaviors and affects.
Keywords: maximizing, satisficing

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